fix path traversal vulnerability in config loader#2
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Fix path traversal vulnerability in `Config::load_or_default` by canonicalizing and validating the config file path before reading. ## Changes - Canonicalize the input path to resolve symlinks and `..` components - Validate that the canonical path is within the expected config directory - Return an error if the path escapes the allowed boundary ## Why The original code read files directly from the provided path without validation. An attacker could manipulate the path using traversal sequences like `../../../etc/passwd` or symlinks to access sensitive files outside the intended config directory. Canonicalizing the path resolves these tricks to their true location, and the boundary check ensures only files within the config directory can be accessed. ## Semgrep Finding Details The application builds a file path from potentially untrusted data, which can lead to a path traversal vulnerability. An attacker can manipulate the path which the application uses to access files. If the application does not validate user input and sanitize file paths, sensitive files such as configuration or user data can be accessed, potentially creating or overwriting files. To prevent this vulnerability, validate and sanitize any input that is used to create references to file paths. Also, enforce strict file access controls. For example, choose privileges allowing public-facing applications to access only the required files. anthony@chovy.com requested this Autofix PR for [this finding](https://semgrep.dev/orgs/profullstack_inc/findings/791655676) from the detection rule [rust.actix.path-traversal.tainted-path.tainted-path](https://semgrep.dev/r/rust.actix.path-traversal.tainted-path.tainted-path).
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Fix path traversal vulnerability in
Config::load_or_defaultby canonicalizing and validating the config file path before reading.Changes
..componentsWhy
The original code read files directly from the provided path without validation. An attacker could manipulate the path using traversal sequences like
../../../etc/passwdor symlinks to access sensitive files outside the intended config directory. Canonicalizing the path resolves these tricks to their true location, and the boundary check ensures only files within the config directory can be accessed.Semgrep Finding Details
The application builds a file path from potentially untrusted data, which can lead to a path traversal vulnerability. An attacker can manipulate the path which the application uses to access files. If the application does not validate user input and sanitize file paths, sensitive files such as configuration or user data can be accessed, potentially creating or overwriting files. To prevent this vulnerability, validate and sanitize any input that is used to create references to file paths. Also, enforce strict file access controls. For example, choose privileges allowing public-facing applications to access only the required files.
anthony@chovy.com requested this Autofix PR for this finding from the detection rule rust.actix.path-traversal.tainted-path.tainted-path.